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ABSTRACT 
In response to the rise of terrorism in the South West Indian Ocean and its potential to 
threaten national stability and security, the government of the Republic of Mauritius 
recently established a Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU) under the supervision of the 
National Counter Terrorism Committee (NCTC). This thesis examines the challenges 
involved in organizing this unit, whose mission is to collect and analyze all terrorism-
related intelligence, and to disseminate the finished product to the country’s law and 
order apparatus.  This agency will be vital for integrating national counter terrorism 
efforts and strategies. However, this laudable effort to make the Republic of Mauritius 
more resilient to the threat posed by terrorism will require significant legal and 
organizational changes. This thesis examines similar organizations in the United States 
and elsewhere in order to develop lessons learned and best practices that can be applied 
in Mauritius. This study finds there will be a need to pool all available resources and 
bring multiple strands of expertise under one roof in a judicious mix of the state’s 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In recent decades, scientific progress and the effects of globalization have had significant 
impact on our daily life. However, these changes are a mixed blessing, with far reaching 
effects and unimagined consequences. While innovations in technology, communication, 
and transportation contribute to improvements in our standard of living and facilitate our 
day-to-day activities, progress has also created a borderless network of highly motivated 
adversaries–terrorists–who act unpredictably and with increasing levels of ferocity 
around the world. Consequently, terrorism has today become a major concern to all 
governments and poses a significant threat to our values and way of life. Because terrorist 
attacks are unpredictable, governments must act proactively to afford a safe and secure 
environment for law-abiding peace loving communities. 
The government of the Republic of Mauritius is much attuned to the omnipresent 
threats from terrorism, such as those resulting from open and direct air access to many 
countries where terrorist activities already exist. Though the Republic of Mauritius is 
arguably more secure than most countries in the Indian Ocean, the nation has nonetheless 
taken preventive measures to mitigate the terrorist threat. In the aftermath of the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, a National Counter Terrorism 
Committee (NCTC), chaired by the Secretary for Home Affairs, was established at the 
level of the Prime Minister’s office to review national counterterrorism measures on a 
regular basis. The latest development is the establishment of the Counter Terrorism Unit 
(CTU) in 2009, tasked with collecting and analyzing all terrorism-related intelligence, 
and ultimately disseminating the finished product to the country’s law and order 
apparatus. This unit is still at its inception stage. Once it is fully operational, it will 
function under the supervision of the National Counter Terrorism Committee, and will be 
directly responsible to the Prime Minister. This thesis examines the organizational and 
policy challenges that the CTU will face, and examines similar organizations in the 
United States and elsewhere in an effort to develop lessons learned and best practices that 
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The Republic of Mauritius is a multi-ethnic society divided by religion, caste, 
language, and ethnicity. The main communities are the Hindu descendants of indentured 
laborers who originated from India, Creole descendants of African slaves, Indo-Muslims 
from western and northern India, Tamils from Southern India, Chinese, and a minority of 
European ethnic communities—French, British, and Dutch.  It is an island which 
occupies a key strategic location in the Southern Indian Ocean, with an Exclusive 
Economic Zone of 1.9 million square kilometers.  
The country is renowned as an island paradise where tourists enjoy peace, calm 
and security. However, the island is located in the midst of some major cross-currents in 
international terrorism. There are established linkages between Tanzania, South Africa, 
and other countries of sub-Saharan Africa on the one hand, and terrorist hubs located in 
the Pakistan-Afghanistan region on the other. The ideological wellsprings of Salafism in 
West Asia are not far away. Nearer home, major sea lanes and maritime traffic in our 
vicinity remain potential targets. A robust democracy, advanced technology, vibrant 
tourist industry, good telecommunications, and offshore banking make Mauritius a 
potential area of interest for forces who may be tempted to use our open and free society 
to disrupt peace and threaten our prosperity. Indeed, though the Republic of Mauritius 
has not been home to incidents of such magnitude, globalization makes the threat of 
terrorism omnipresent. The November 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai, India, is a bitter 
and harsh reminder of this fact. However, the Republic of Mauritius has always been 
proactive in mitigating the threats from terrorism.  
A. COUNTERTERRORISM MEASURES 
Since independence in 1968, the Republic of Mauritius has taken a number of 
steps to align itself with efforts in other countries to mitigate the effects of terrorism. 
Indeed, it has enacted a number of laws criminalizing terrorist acts and terrorist-related 
activities, entered regional and international agreements for the war against terror, and 
developed a variety of internal mechanisms to combat terrorism. 
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1. Legal Framework 
The government of Mauritius has passed a number of laws to support the 
counterterrorism efforts of the country.1  These include the following: 
 Extradition Act 1970  
 Immigration Act 1970 
 Continental Shelf Act 1982 
 Explosives Act 1982 
 Civil Aviation (Hijacking and Other Offences) Act 33 of 1985. 
 Banking Act 1988 
 Stock Exchange Act No 38 of 1988 
 Unit Trusts Act No 26 of 1989 
 Customs Acts 1989 
 Insurance (Amendment) Act No 22 of 1990 
 Foreign Exchange Dealers Act 1995 
 Securities (Central Depository, Clearing and Settlement) Act 1996  
 The Dangerous Drugs Act 2000 
 Financial Services Development Act 2001 
 Trusts Act No 14 of 2001 
 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002 
 Prevention of Corruption Act 2002 
 The Financial Intelligence and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2002 
                                                 
1 Laws of Mauritius, 
http://www.gov.mu/portal/site/GovtHomePagesite/menuitem.c0a01177fcf48dfcf6b 
e501054508a0c/?content_id =8b4484d776e98010VgnVCM100000ca6a12acRCRD (accessed Oct 29, 
2011). 
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 The Financial Intelligence and Anti-Money Laundering Regulations 2003 
 The Anti-Money Laundering (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2003 
 Prevention of Terrorism Act (Special Measures) GN 14 of 2003 
 The Dangerous Drugs (Amendment) Act 2003 
 The Geneva Conventions Amendment Act 2003 
 The Chemical Weapons Convention Act 2003 
 The Radiation Protection Act 2003 
 The Computer Misuse and Cybercrime Act 2003 
 The Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism Act 2003 
 Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal and Related Matters Act 2003 
 Financial Reporting Act No 45 of 2004 
 Data Protection Act No 13 of 2004 
 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Act 2004 
 Dangerous Chemical Control Act 2004 
 Banking Act 2004 
 Bank of Mauritius Act 2004 
 Firearms Act 2006 
 Prevention of Terrorism (International Obligations) Act 41 of 2008 
2. International and Regional Cooperation 
The Republic of Mauritius belongs to various international and regional security 
organizations.  It has adopted a number of conventions and resolutions and has contracted 
partnership agreements to show its commitment to addressing all forms and 
manifestations of terrorist threats.  
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As a member of the United Nations, the Republic of Mauritius is a signatory to 
the following legal documents: 
 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 
 UN Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing 2003 
 UN Convention  Against Transnational Organized Crime 2003 
 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against 
Internationally Protected Persons 2003 
 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 
2005 
As part of the South African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization, 
the Republic of Mauritius actively shares information with member states to prevent 
cross border crime. And as a member of the African Union, the Republic of Mauritius 
signed and ratified the 1999 African Union Convention on the Prevention and Combating 
of Terrorism and contributes to the African Centre for the Study and Research on 
Terrorism, established in Algiers in 2004 as to raise the African Union’s capacity to 
prevent and combat terrorism in Africa. Lastly, the government of Mauritius signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding with the government of India in 2008 to facilitate the 
exchange of information relating to money laundering and terrorist financing.  
3. Internal Structures 
The country started developing the operational component to respond to terrorism 
threats in the early 1980’s. At first, with the assistance of the French government, it set 
up a tactical unit as the strike force for counter terrorism operations, the Groupe 
d’Intervention de la Police Mauricienne (GIPM), which replicates the French Groupe 
d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN). Later, the government created the 
Radiation Protection Authority (RPA) in 2006, upon proclamation of the 2003 Radiation 
Protection Act. The RPA, under the aegis of the Ministry of Energy and Public Utilities, 
deals with the regulation, control, and supervision of radiological activities related to the 
acquisition, importation, use, transportation and disposal of radioactive material, 
radioactive substances, x-ray equipment, and other sources of ionizing radiation. In the 
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aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, a National 
Counter Terrorism Committee, chaired by the Secretary for Home Affairs, was set up at 
the level of the Prime Minister’s Office to review the country’s counterterrorism 
measures on a regular basis. The latest development is the establishment of the Counter 
Terrorism Unit (CTU), charged with collecting and analyzing all terrorism-related 
intelligence, and ultimately disseminating the finished product to the country’s law and 
order apparatus. The CTU functions under the supervision of the National Counter 
Terrorism Committee (NCTC), and is directly responsible to the Prime Minister. 
B. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The aim of this thesis is to explore how the CTU is best organized to effectively 
fulfill its mission, which is to proactively combat all forms of terrorism in order to make 
the Republic of Mauritius more resilient to terrorism. This study addresses issues 
pertaining to the type of network needed for effective collection, sharing and 
dissemination of intelligence among the relevant agencies in the intelligence community. 
The thesis also investigates the practices that should be adopted by the CTU to ensure 
that the unit operates within the parameters of the rule of law and without infringing on 
civil liberties. 
C. PROBLEMS 
At the outset, it seems likely that the two main problems in developing the CTU 
of the Republic of Mauritius will be information sharing between agencies in the 
intelligence community and the challenges to intelligence collection with regard to civil 
liberties.  
1. Lack of Interagency Cooperation 
Unlike the United States, with its National Security Act of 1947 and Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the Republic of Mauritius has no official 
legal document specifying the agencies that comprise the intelligence community. While 
some intelligence agencies are part of the Mauritius Police Force, which is under the 
central command of the Commissioner of Police, the others are controlled by various 
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government ministries. Given this context, there will be a need to address issues of 
interagency coordination and cooperation to set up an intelligence sharing network to 
facilitate effective, efficient, and timely responses in the fight against terrorism. 
2. Effect of Intelligence Activities on Civil liberties 
The nation’s strong civil society places a lot of emphasis on the protection of civil 
liberties and compliance with the rule of law by enforcement agencies. Consequently, 
intelligence agencies will have to project legitimacy in order to win the trust of the 
population. It is argued that legitimacy can only be achieved with proper oversight of 
intelligence agencies and appropriate mechanisms to ensure that they operate within legal 
parameters and in strict compliance with the rule of law.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Intelligence is a key factor in countering terrorism as it can provide the means to 
anticipate, pre-empt, and respond to this threat.2 Generating actionable intelligence for 
effective, efficient, and timely responses is a cycle which involves several processes, 
including collection and analysis of raw information. However, the cycle is incomplete if 
intelligence is not properly shared.  From this perspective, it can be argued that the failure 
of the intelligence community to respond to terrorist attacks can be attributed to failures 
in any of these three processes–collection, analysis, or sharing.  
To substantiate this argument, the first part of this literature review analyzes the 
arguments posited as the main causes of failure within the intelligence community by the 
three main schools of thought—the orthodox school, the intelligence reformist school and 
the Central Intelligence Agency critics’ school.3 In the second part, I argue that factors 
such as competing interests, organizational culture, technical incompatibilities, and the 
absence of a coordinating body can act as obstacles to cooperation or “firewalls” between 
agencies of the intelligence community.  
                                                 
2 Bruce Hoffman, “Intelligence and Terrorism: Emerging Threats and New Security Challenges in the 
Post Cold War Era,” Intelligence and National Security 11, no. 2 (1996): 219. 
3 Erik J. Dahl, “Intelligence and Terrorism,” in Robert Denemark et al., eds., The International Studies 
Encyclopedia, part of the International Studies Association Compendium Project (Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2010), 3862–3882.       
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1. Theoretical Perspectives 
Dahl argues that in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, three main schools of 
thought have emerged to explain the intelligence community’s failure to significantly 
impact the threat posed by terrorism.  This section reviews each of these schools of 
thought, and considers what the analysis of each school would imply for the development 
of the CTU in Mauritius.   
a. Orthodox School 
The proponents of this school of thought adopt a very pessimistic 
approach, arguing that intelligence failures are bound to happen and that nothing can be 
done to prevent their occurrence as they are difficult to predict.4 They advocate that the 
best course of action is to develop plans to deal with the effects of terrorist attacks.5 They 
claim that surprise attacks are more likely if those responsible for decision making in the 
fight against terrorism disregard the warnings of the intelligence community.6 However, 
they admit that there is fierce competition for the attention of policy makers, in the 
massive amount of intelligence about a wide range of threats, as well as between such 
threats and other pressing policy issues.7 When there is a multitude of dots, the number of 
ways to connect the dots increases, adding more complexity to already complex issues.8  
This school of thought offers few lessons that can be used in the 
establishment of a new CTU. The goal of the new unit is to prevent terrorist attacks 
wherever possible. Because the orthodox school believes that prevention is very difficult, 
we must look elsewhere for useful advice and suggestions for accomplishing a mission of 
prevention.   
                                                 
4 Richard A. Posner, Countering Terrorism: Blurred Focus, Halting Steps (Lanham, MD: Rowman 
and Littlefield, 2007), 23. 
5 Dahl, “Intelligence and Terrorism,” 3869. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., 3870. 
8 Richard K. Betts, Enemies of intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 105. 
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b. Intelligence Reformist School 
The scholars and analysts of the intelligence reformist school are less 
pessimistic than their orthodox counterparts. They claim that failures occur because of 
the lack of communication between agencies of the intelligence community, and this lack 
of communication is due to organizational structure.9 Zegart argues that counterterrorism 
efforts are less effective when there is no central mechanism with a common strategy to 
coordinate agencies that are often scattered and underfunded.10 The intelligence reformist 
school argues that the analytical processing of information is not assigned enough 
importance, and the imagination to make sense of information already at hand is 
lacking.11 In this context, Dahl argues that very often too much emphasis is laid on 
developing tactical level intelligence which is not adequate for generating the strategic-
level intelligence assessments required by current threats.12  
This school of thought suggests that interagency cooperation and 
coordination among agencies, as well as in-depth analysis of information, are important 
factors that the Counter Terrorist Unit of the Republic of Mauritius Unit should consider 
to support its ability collect information and produce actionable intelligence.  
 c. Central Intelligence Agency Critics’ School 
The third school of thought was developed and named following scholarly 
analysis of the responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency in the September 9/11 
attacks. It argues that the success of terrorist attacks can be attributed to inadequate 
strategies for dealing with a phenomenon unlike the type of threat we were used to in the 
past.13 As a remedy to this problem, Jenkins supports building up the institutional 
 
 
                                                 
9 Dahl, “Intelligence and Terrorism,” 3869–3871. 
10 Amy B. Zegart, Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2007), 3. 
11 Dahl, “Intelligence and Terrorism,” 3869–3870. 
12 Ibid., 3870. 
13 Ibid., 3869. 
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intelligence capabilities of the intelligence community to collect information, and argues 
that more focus should be put on human intelligence and intelligence units at the local 
level.14  
The lessons from this school of thought for Mauritius are very enriching. 
From this perspective, it is worthwhile for the CTU to consider using or tapping into the 
Mauritius Police Force’s existing information collection network. 
2. Obstacles to the Intelligence Cycle within the Intelligence Community 
Interagency coordination and cooperation within the intelligence community in 
the fight against terrorism is a prerequisite for effective, efficient, and timely response. 
Factors such as competing interests, organizational culture, technical incompatibilities, 
and absence of a coordinating body can impede the creation of the conductive 
environment necessary for an effective intelligence sharing network. 
a. Competing Interests 
With limited resources, governments nowadays place increasing emphasis 
on performance-based budgeting in the public sector so as to more efficiently and 
effectively manage public expenditures.15 Consequently, this increases the competition 
between the agencies of the intelligence community over finite governmental resources. 
Indeed, these agencies continuously strive to increase their visibility within the 
government sector, as higher visibility is synonymous with higher budget allocation. This 
has become a major obstacle to interagency cooperation, as there is less willingness to 
collaborate and to share information. Worse still, they are now competing against each 
other.16 
                                                 
14 Brian Jenkins, “Statement to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States,” Washington (March 2003), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/hearings1/witness_jenkins.htm. 
(accessed May 25, 2011). 
15Marc Robinson, and Duncan Last, “A Basic Model of Performance-Based Budgeting,” International 
Monetary Fund, (Sept 2009), 2.  
16 Lawrence E. Cline, “Interagency Decision Making,” in Civil-Military Responses to Terrorism 
(Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 1.  
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b.  Organizational Culture 
Each organization has its own set of values, beliefs, norms and practices 
developed over time that have worked well enough to be considered valid. An 
organizational culture determines how individuals within the organization behave and 
how they expect others to behave. More importantly, it drives the way the organization 
conducts business and interacts with the wider community.17 It can be argued that 
organizational culture can hamper effective cooperation between agencies, as was 
pointed out in the 9/11 Commission Report. With time, an organizational culture can 
create an even more complex set of rules and encompass a wider set of beliefs that 
discourages agencies within the intelligence community from even seeking to share 
information.18 
c. Technical Incompatibilities 
Cline argues that differences in agencies’ levels of sophistication, 
especially in technical matters, can act as a barrier to effective coordination.19 In a 
number of countries, information sharing cannot be effected because of basic problems 
like incompatible computer operating systems or absence of common databases, issues 
that sometimes occur when agencies do not yet see technology as an important asset. 
Technical incompatibilities can be explained by the lack of common procedures for the 
acquisition of equipment, lack of resources, or simply some organizations’ resistance to 
change.  
d. Absence of a Central Coordinating Body 
The intelligence community is composed of a multitude of agencies that 
often do not fall under the same department or chain of command. It is not uncommon to 
find that by virtue of their roles and responsibilities, these agencies occupy equal status in 
                                                 
17 Amanda Sinclair, “Approaches to Organisational Culture and Ethics,” Journal of Business Ethics 
12, no. 1 (1993), 63–64. 
18 Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911 
Report.pdf (accessed May 25, 2011), 539. 
19 Cline, “Interagency Decision Making,” 3. 
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the hierarchy. Thus, finding out who is in charge is problematic.20 Under these 
circumstances, agencies are not bound to cooperate or share information unless there is a 
central body with the relevant legal provisions to act as the coordinating mechanism. It 
can be argued that this is a prerequisite for putting together the various pieces and strands 
gathered by individual agencies. Even more importantly, because the window of 
opportunity to respond to an imminent threat is very small, a coordinating mechanism is 
necessary for fast and effective decision making. 
3. Conclusion 
This literature review reveals that intelligence failures happen for a number of 
reasons: the difficulty of predicting terrorist attacks, the lack of interagency cooperation, 
insufficient emphasis on the analytical processing of information, and/or the reluctance of 
the intelligence community to focus more on human intelligence. Furthermore, the lack 
of communication between intelligence agencies due to organizational structure, 
technical incompatibilities or competing interests, along with the absence of a central 
mechanism for coordinating among agencies, can all increase the propensity for 
intelligence failures. 
These observations motivate a systematic examination of an integrated model 
involving a judicious mix of the defense, diplomatic, intelligence and law-enforcement 
capabilities of the state. Pooling all available resources and drawing together multiple 
strands of expertise can remove the barriers to effective interagency cooperation so the 
dots can be connected more accurately. This model can be used to show how the CTU 
can be organized to most effectively collect, collate and analyze terrorism-related 
intelligence and disseminate the finished product to the nation’s law and order apparatus. 
E. METHODOLOGY AND THESIS OUTLINE 
In the next chapter, I provide the theoretical background for the development of 
this thesis, identifying the main characteristics of intelligence services, the various steps 
of the intelligence process, and the legal framework and types of mechanisms (executive, 
                                                 
20 Cline, “Interagency Decision Making,” 4. 
 12 
legislative, judicial, and internal) required to ensure that security intelligence agencies 
operate within a democratic framework and are accountable to the civil society. 
I believe that the 9/11 Commission Report was instrumental in reshaping the 
United States intelligence community to improve the effectiveness of its response to 
terrorism. Many academic studies analyze the extent to which these recommendations 
have been put into practice and evaluate the effectiveness of these reforms. Because I am 
doing my master’s degree in the United States, I have taken the opportunity to interact 
with the professionals in this field. Their practical experience and expertise adds value to 
this thesis. Accordingly, in the third chapter I analyze how the United States has 
restructured its intelligence community since the 9/11 attacks. Chapter III explores the 
office of the Director of National Intelligence, the three main categories of intelligence 
agencies and their various functional mission support units, in order to identify 
organizations that might serve as models for the Republic of Mauritius Counter Terrorism 
Unit. 
In the fourth chapter, I analyze in depth the three main U.S. models of Counter 
Terrorism–the National Counter Terrorism Center, the Joint Terrorism Task Force and 
the Intelligence Fusion Centers–by focusing on their organizational structures, roles and 
responsibilities in order to identify key points that might be useful for organizing the 
CTU of the Republic of Mauritius.  
In the last chapter, I focus on the implementation of the lessons learned in the 
previous chapters and through personal interactions with the Deputy Director of the 
Northern California Regional Intelligence Center, the Senior Officer of the Joint 
Terrorism Task Force in San Francisco, the Commanding Officer of the U.S.C.G. 
Intelligence Coordination Center in Suitland, the Section Chief of the Counterterrorism 
Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Washington, D.C., and the Division 
Chief of the Directorate of Intelligence and Information Sharing of the Naval Criminal 
Investigative Service in Quantico. These meetings were organized by my thesis advisor 
in liaison with the International Program Office, the Naval Criminal Investigative 
Service, and the Information Dominance Center for Excellence at the Naval Postgraduate 
School. 
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II. THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE  
Intelligence plays a fundamental role in the development of an effective 
counterterrorism strategy.  Among other advantages, it can help identify individuals and 
groups engaged in terrorism as well as their locations and sources of recruitment. It 
enables security agencies to track down the suspects and their logistic and financial 
supports. In addition, intelligence provides advance warning of potential terrorist threats. 
It can provide tactical information for counterterrorism operations to disrupt terrorist 
activities and terrorist command and control structures. Lastly, it can aid management of 
an actual or potential crisis by providing decision makers with actionable intelligence.21  
Accordingly, the collection and analysis of information have always been 
considered extremely valuable to states. The emergence of agencies to address national, 
regional, or international security issues is a common feature of many countries around 
the world, especially in the last century. Commonly referred to as intelligence agencies, 
these special organizations play an important role in providing states with the necessary 
intelligence22 to make sense of their environment, assess present and potential 
adversaries,23 avoid strategic surprises, provide long-term expertise, support the policy 
process, and maintain the secrecy of information, needs and methods.24 However, it is 
important to note that the process of collecting raw information and converting it into 
actionable intelligence is part of larger cycle. In a democratic framework, intelligence 
gathering must be conducted in compliance with the rule of law to ensure that the civil 
rights of individuals are not violated. Indeed, there is a need for a democratic control so 
the roles and responsibilities of the intelligence community are directed by the civilian 
                                                 
21 Anneli Botha, Counterterrorism Training Manual (Pretoria, SA: Institute for Security Studies, 
2009), 209. 
22 “Intelligence refers to information that meets the stated or understood needs of policy makers and 
has been collected, processed, and narrowed to meet those needs.” Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From 
Secrets to Policy (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009), 1. 
23 Robert Jervis, “Intelligence, Civil-Intelligence Relations, and Democracy,” in Thomas C. Bruneau 
and Steven C. Boraz, Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 2007), vii. 
24 Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 2. 
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authority, the parameters within which it operates are defined in law, and there are 
established procedures for reviewing issues such as use of resources and personnel 
management.25  For example, in the U.S., a legal framework regulates the work of 
intelligence agencies and various control mechanisms ensure that they operate within a 
democratic framework.26 
A. CHARACTERISTICS OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES 
An analysis of intelligence agencies reveals that they share some common 
characteristics: adaptability, organizational structure, organizational command, 
relationship with the intelligence community, and a mechanism to ensure accountability. 
In this chapter, I analyze the development of intelligence services dealing with terrorism 
from France, England, and Australia to identify the important characteristics for 
developing a counter terrorism unit. These countries are chosen because of their 
relevance to the situation in Mauritius.  
The Republic of Mauritius was a French colony from 1638 to 1810 and the 
French influenced the mode of operations and how the country deals with internal 
security issues. In the 1980s, the French government supported the government of 
Mauritius’s establishment of response unit to deal with public order problems in general 
and terrorism in particular. This unit, known as the Mobile Wing, is under the command 
of the paramilitary unit of the country. The riot control component is organized and 
equipped along the same lines as the French gendarmerie mobile, while its counter 
terrorism component is a replica of the French Groupe d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie 
Nationale (GIGN), the counter terrorism strike force. 
The present political and legal structures and law enforcement organizations of 
Mauritius, including the paramilitary, were significantly influenced by the British; 
Mauritius was a British colony from 1810 to 1968. The country adopted the Westminster 
model of government with a prime minister as the head of the Government. Court 
                                                 
25 Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz, “Intelligence Reform: Balancing Democracy and 
Effectiveness,” in Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz, Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to 
Democratic Control and Effectiveness (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), 14. 
26 Ibid., 13–16. 
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procedures, criminal law, and laws of evidence are all derived from the British criminal 
justice system, as the country was policed under British law until independence. In 
addition, the paramilitary unit is structured on the same lines as the infantry battalions of 
the British Army. 
Like the Republic of Mauritius, Australia is an island with a very diverse 
population, and both lie in the Indian Ocean. Both countries are presently very concerned 
with the emergence of extremists’ jihadist networks that link militants in South East and 
South West Asia with the Middle East. 
1. Adaptability 
In France, the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST), set up during 
World War II, was responsible for gathering intelligence at the domestic level. Their 
focus was to identify Axis agents and collaborators. During the Cold War, their field of 
operation broadened. In addition to monitoring the threat posed by agents of the Soviet 
Komityet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosty (KGB), the agency played an active role 
against the national insurgency in Algeria.27 It is argued that the real shift of the DST to 
counter terrorism proper happened in the 1970’s, when it confronted Carlos the Jackal 
and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia. The DST became the 
principal agency monitoring threats from domestic Arab groups supported by Iran after 
the involvement of French forces in the first Gulf War and in Lebanon. Nowadays, the 
focus of the DST is on the threat posed by cells that are associated with the Al Qaeda 
network and to Al Qaeda for the Islamic Maghreb, which emerged from the Algerian 
Salafist Group for Prayer and Combat.28  
In the United Kingdom, the Security Service, also known as MI5 (Military 
Intelligence, Group 5) was created in the early twentieth century attempted to mitigate the 
threat posed by Germany. Germany was conducting an espionage campaign in Britain 
aimed primarily at military targets and the British were concerned with a probable 
                                                 
27 Brian A. Jackson, “Considering the Creation of a Domestic Intelligence Agency in the United 
States,” Rand (2009), 67. 
28 Ibid., 72. 
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invasion. After World War II, the Security Service was given the primary responsibility 
for defense from acts of subversion aimed at overthrowing the government by unlawful 
means. MI5 continued to operate alongside the police Special Branches. The most 
significant change is the close relationship that developed between the security and 
intelligence agencies beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s. With emerging threats 
of domestic and international terrorism, the Security Service started gathering 
intelligence on foreign nationals operating in the UK and members of terrorist 
organizations based abroad, in collaboration with other intelligence agencies including 
the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), which is responsible for intelligence, and the 
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), known as the signals intelligence 
agency.29 
2. Organizational Tasks of Intelligence Agencies 
The mission of advising the state after identifying and investigating threats to 
national security is the ultimate goal of all intelligence agencies. However, they also 
perform other tasks to make the country more resistant to terrorist attacks. For example, 
the primary task of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) is to 
produce tactical and strategic threat assessments on a regular basis. The focus of the 
former is on the probability that specific places, events, or categories of people will be 
targets of terrorist attacks. Strategic assessment, on the other hand, focuses on monitoring 
the evolution of regional and international terrorism and its probable impact on the 
country.30 
The ASIO advises the private and public sectors on how to protect critical 
infrastructures through outreach programs designed to sensitize them to the risk of 
terrorist attacks. They have also set up a network for sharing classified materials with 
their partners to enhance the protection of their assets as well as the protection of those 
working in their organizations.31 
                                                 
29 Jackson, “Considering the Creation of a Domestic Intelligence Agency in the United States,” 118–
120. 
30 Ibid., 16–17. 
31 Ibid., 17–18. 
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The ASIO is also responsible for vetting personnel who by virtue of their position 
will have access to sensitive information, as well as those who work in secured areas, like 
seaports and airports, or with access to dangerous explosive material.32  
The ASIO plays an active role in border security by helping the immigration 
department exercise proper control over people entering the country. This is achieved 
with an up-to-date database of people deemed potential threats if allowed on the territory. 
It is also responsible for assessing people granted temporary protection visas and making 
recommendations for visa extensions.33  
Lastly, the ASIO is the lead agency of a governmental consortium to prevent 
terrorists from developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) using resources available 
in the country. It maintains a database on chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and 
explosive terrorism and conducts regular assessments of the probability of terrorists using 
unconventional means to cause mass destruction.34  
3. Organizational Command  
Given the very small window of opportunity for effective response to imminent 
threats, intelligence agencies need a command structure that allows rapid decision 
making. The leadership of intelligence agencies needs access to the highest level 
government decision makers with the shortest possible delay and without having to go 
through the normal bureaucratic channels. For example, in the United Kingdom (UK), the 
Director General (DG) of the MI5 and the officers in charge of the other intelligence 
services have the right to direct access to the prime minister, who bears the overall 
responsibility for national security.35 There is a need to ensure that those entrusted with 
such powers have the required expertise to shoulder their responsibilities and at the same 
time make judicious use of their power.  
                                                 
32 Jackson, “Considering the Creation of a Domestic Intelligence Agency in the United States,” 18. 
33 Ibid., 18. 
34 Ibid., 19. 
35 Ibid., 124–125. 
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It is important to note that while it is common practice in some countries for 
intelligence agencies to recruit the individual to head the organization from within their 
own agencies,36 in some places there is a complete departure from this practice.  For 
example, in Australia, the tendency is to recruit the Director General of the ASIO from 
outside the agency, to avoid the impression that it is a family business–old-boy inside 
trading37—and to prevent it from becoming a self-replicating bureaucratic structure.38 
4. Relationship with Law Enforcement and Other Intelligence Agencies 
Interagency coordination and cooperation within the intelligence community in 
the fight against terrorism is a prerequisite for effective, efficient, and timely response. A 
conducive environment is therefore of paramount importance in creating an intelligence 
sharing network.  In the United Kingdom, the Security Service Act of 1989 and a number 
of ministerial guidelines enable the Security Service to collaborate closely with the 
Special Branches of the police forces at regional and local levels for counterterrorism 
activities.39 From a structural perspective, the Security Service has a number of regional 
offices; the police have Counter Terrorism Intelligence Units (CTIUs) and Counter 
Terrorism Units (CTUs) at the regional level to facilitate the information gathering and 
intelligence sharing process.40 The Security Service subsequently coordinates with the 
Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and the GCHQ for an overall domestic and international 
threat analysis.41 
5. Accountability and Oversight 
Intelligence agencies rely a lot on people in order to fulfill their mission, and 
people are among their most important sources of information. Consequently, it is 
absolutely necessary that these agencies project legitimacy and trust to ensure effective 
                                                 
36 Jackson, “Considering the Creation of a Domestic Intelligence Agency in the United States,” 125.  
37 Ibid., 24–25. 
38 Ibid., 25. 
39 Ibid., 130. 
40 Ibid., 131. 
41 Ibid., 129. 
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cooperation with the population. This requires proper oversight of intelligence agencies 
and guarantees that they will operate legally and in accordance with the rule of law. For 
example, in Australia, the roles and functions of the ASIO are overseen by the Inspector 
General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) and the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Intelligence and Security (PJCIS).42 The former can access organizational staff and 
documentation in order to investigate the legal compliance of both past and current 
operations.43 The latter has the authority to investigate matters pertaining to the 
administration and expenditures of the ASIO.44 
B. THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS 
Johnson argues that intelligence as a term can be defined from two different 
perspectives. It can refer to the knowledge and foreknowledge of the world that state 
level decision makers need to make strategic decisions. It can also refer to specific 
conditions in a particular theatre, such as a battlefield, at a specific period of time.45 
Though both approaches are relevant, this thesis focuses on the strategic perspective 
because the role of the CTU is to inform the government of Mauritius about threats from 
domestic and international terrorism. 
 Even from this perspective, intelligence can further be defined in four different 
ways. Firstly, it can refer to information at the domestic and international levels that 
should be collected and analyzed to assist policy makers’ understanding of the political, 
economic, social, and military environment.46 Secondly, it can be thought of as a 
sequence of steps that starts with requirements by decision makers for information on 
specific issues and includes the process by which this information is collected, analyzed 
and subsequently submitted to them so informed decisions can be made.47 Thirdly, it can 
                                                 
42 Jackson, “Considering the Creation of a Domestic Intelligence Agency in the United States,” 34. 
43 Ibid., p34–35. 
44 Ibid., 35. 
45 Loch K. Johnson, Handbook of Intelligence Studies (New York: Routledge, 2007), 1. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Stephen Marrin, “Intelligence Analysis and Decision-Making,” in Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin  and 
Mark Phytian, Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates (New York: Routledge, 2009), 131. 
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denote a set of missions executed by secret intelligence agencies, including the collection 
and analysis of information, counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and covert actions. 
Lastly, it can refer to a set of agencies that form part of a larger community responsible 
for these missions. Despite differences in emphasis, all require that the raw information 
that has been collected be processed, and then analyzed, before it is disseminated to the 
policy makers.  
1. Collection 
Collection48 is the gathering of raw information that will be analyzed to produce 
intelligence to enable policy makers to make informed decisions.49 There are various 
methods and techniques that are used to fulfill this mission: imagery intelligence, signals 
intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, open-source intelligence, and 
human intelligence.50 
a. Imagery Intelligence 
The technical developments in aviation that took place in the early 19
th
 
century significantly improved the ability of nations to observe foreign activities from an 
overhead vantage point. Reconnaissance aircraft were used extensively in both World 
War I and II to spy on opponents’ fortifications and troop deployments. During the Cold 
War, camera-carrying satellites were initially used by the United States and the Soviet 
Union to monitor each other’s military capabilities using techniques based on the 
principles of reflection of visible light, reflection of infrared radiation (heat), and 
reflection of bouncing radio waves to capture the image of the target. However, the most 
critical issue at that time was the delay between the collection and the processing phase, 
as they had to wait for a satellite, or part of a satellite, to return to earth in order to access 
the data recorded on photographic films. Nowadays, this issue is resolved. The 
 
                                                 
48 “Collection is the bedrock of intelligence, that without it the entire enterprise has little meaning.” 
Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 61. 
49 Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community (Westview Press, 2012), 4. 
50 Loch K. Johnson and James J. Wirtz, Intelligence and National Security: The Secret World of Spies 
(Oxford: University Press, 2008), 52. 
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differences in visible light levels that are reflected from targets and collected by imagery 
satellites are converted into digital modes and transmitted by relay satellites to ground 
stations almost simultaneously.  
It is important to note that the number of nations with this technical 
capability has increased, and significant improvement has been observed in terms of the 
quality of images collected. Also of significance is the use of pilotless aircraft operated 
remotely from ground bases. The use of unmanned aerial vehicles that combine 
characteristics of satellites and aircraft is an important trend in recent decades, especially 
in combat zones such as Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition to their electro-optical, 
infrared, or radar-imaging sensors for imagery collection, such platforms can engage the 
enemy using mounted weapon systems.51  
b. Signals Intelligence 
According to Johnson, signals intelligence can be divided into two basic 
subcategories, communications intelligence and electronics intelligence. The former 
refers to the interception of communications transmitted using different means 
(telephones, walkie-talkies, cell phones, the Internet, and computer networks) between 
two parties–foreign governments, organizations, or individuals. Electronic intelligence, 
on the other hand, is the collection of the electronic signatures left behind by modern 
weapons and tracking systems in order to discover their technical capabilities.  
Nowadays, signals intelligence is considered one of the most important 
and sensitive forms of intelligence.52  It involves the interception, study, and analysis of 
foreign and domestic communication signals. This intelligence collection technique is 
greatly improved since the first World War, when intercept of foreign communications 
was mostly conducted by tapping the underwater cables of foreign nations. With the 
proliferation of earth-based collectors–ships, planes, ground sites, and satellites–signals 
intelligence is more easily picked up from the air. A recent innovation in this field is the 
                                                 
51 Jeffrey T. Richelson, “The Technical Collection of Intelligence,” in Loch K. Johnson, Handbook of 
Intelligence Studies (New York: Routledge, 2007), 105–108. 
52 “The ability to intercept communications is highly important, because it gives insight into what is 
being said, planned, and considered.” Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 91. 
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use of unmanned aerial vehicles as a device for the collection of signals, in addition to 
their image gathering capabilities, especially when tracking fast-moving targets is 
required, as is normally the case with terrorist activities.53 
c. Measurement and Signature Intelligence 
Measurement and Signature Intelligence54 is technically derived 
intelligence data that goes beyond the technical capabilities of imagery and signals 
intelligence. The concept is based on the principle that certain physical characteristics of 
objects and events generate significant and characteristic signatures that can help in their 
identification and location.55 It utilizes a wide array of collection and analysis tools, 
including radar, geophysical sensors, infrared and optical sensors, and nuclear radiation 
sensors. Ground-based and sea-based radars can detect and track missiles when they are 
launched, and they also have the technical capabilities to expose the characteristics of 
these weapons. Acoustic, seismic, and magnetic sensors can detect activities, such as 
nuclear tests, with geophysical properties that generate waves of a characteristic 
magnitude; they can also identify engines, such as submarines, with characteristic 
rotation speeds. Infrared and optical sensors can detect the infrared signature of missiles, 
aircraft, spacecraft, large detonations, and certain industrial processes. And nuclear 
radiation sensors can detect the x-rays and gamma rays emitted by a nuclear explosion to 
estimate the location of the explosion and the amount of nuclear material used.  
                                                 
53  Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 90–91. 
54 “Measurement and signature intelligence is intelligence obtained by quantitative and qualitative 
analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependence, modulation, plasma, and hydro 
magnetic) derived from specific technical sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features 
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d. Open-Source Intelligence 
Open source intelligence56 refers to the study and analysis of any verbal, 
written, or electronically transmitted material that can be legally obtained. A former 
senior intelligence official argues that around 95 percent of necessary intelligence today 
can be obtained from these sources.57 In fact, the development of the Internet and the 
changes in fields like telecommunications and science technology have expanded the 
arenas in which open source intelligence can be found. This wider range of open sources 
can be classified under six main categories: (1) Media, which includes printed documents 
such as newspapers and magazines as well as the news broadcast on radio and television; 
(2) Internet-specific sources refers to free exchange of information in forum discussions 
and blogs; (3) Public data consists of all reference materials available for public use, such 
as telephone directories, government reports, hearings and speeches; (4) Professional and 
academic publications can take the form of dissertations, theses, and academic papers; (5) 
Commercial data is exemplified by commercial imagery, and financial and industrial 
assessments; (6) Gray literature, which is local and foreign open source material that can 
only be accessed through specialized channels of distribution, like working documents, 
unpublished works, technical reports, and patents.58  
e. Human Intelligence 
Human intelligence is the collection of sensitive foreign information from 
individuals59 who have first or second hand access to information on issues with 
significant implications for the security or strategic interests of the state. It can be 
conducted in a number of ways. The clandestine service officers may identify and then 
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recruit as spies individuals with access to information of value to the recruiting country. 
The officers responsible for collecting relevant information may operate in foreign 
countries under official or non-official cover. In the former case, an official job and cover 
makes it easier for them to maintain contact with their parent agencies. Undercover 
officers, on the other hand, tend to hold jobs (for example, as journalists) that allow them 
to move freely and ask questions without arousing suspicions. Human intelligence can be 
undertaken by diplomats who by virtue of their positions frequently interact both 
informally and formally with senior foreign government officials. Intelligence can also 
emanate from locals–walk-ins–who for a variety of reasons want to share information 
with a foreign government. Sharing intelligence by establishing a foreign liaison 
relationship with friendly services can be a valuable asset, especially given the fact that 
local intelligence agencies have a better understanding of their region.60  
2. Processing and Exploitation 
In general, most raw information collected by human or technical means does not 
arrive in ready-to-use form.61 It may be necessary to process and exploit information 
from technical sources to convert it into a form that an analyst can use to produce 
finished intelligence.62 Images must be extracted from complex digital signals and 
interpreted through highly refined photographic and electronic processes,63 messages 
must be decrypted and foreign language intercepts translated in order to be useful. 
3. Analysis 
 Raw information does not come with any indication of its importance or inherent 
meaning. It also does not provide direct clues about its relative impact on the future64 and 
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therefore, as Bruneau argues, it is not useful without the proper analysis.65 There is a 
need to put information into historical context or the context of current events, or to place 
it in the most appropriate analytical framework for a thorough understanding so policy 
and decision makers can make correct and timely decisions,66 and also consider 
alternative options and outcomes.67 In a nutshell, it can be argued that analysis68 is the 
most difficult and unforgiving task in the intelligence cycle, not only because the failure 
to identify a potential threat is viewed as a sign of ineffectiveness, but also because it 
reduces the intelligence community’s credibility with policymakers. Making sense of 
information that is often ambiguous, inconsistent, incomplete,69 and sometimes 
contradictory is not an easy task.70 Analysts are expected to assess data–identify patterns 
and figure out their meanings71—with a high level of objectivity, and must make 
judgments in the absence of conclusive evidence.72 
Intelligence analysis is a perpetual fight with uncertainty in which analysts must 
use their own judgment and expertise on the subject matter to make sense of inherently 
ambiguous information in order to produce intelligence with the following 
characteristics.73 Firstly, it must be passed on to the policy maker with the shortest 
possible delay, without waiting for a comprehensive and properly formatted document to 
be produced. Secondly, it should be tailored to the needs of the policymaker and omit 
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superfluous material. Thirdly, because policy makers do not have the luxury of time, 
intelligence reports should be in a format that conveys what they need to know as easily 
and clearly as possible.74 Lastly, intelligence should clearly indicate what are facts, what 
has been added by the analysts based on their expertise, and to what extent the analysts 
are confident with their analysis.75  
4. Dissemination  
Dissemination, as defined by Lowenthal, is the process of conveying finished 
intelligence76 to the policymakers whose needs triggered the process. It can take the form 
of current intelligence or long-term intelligence. Current intelligence refers to intelligence 
on issues that relate to day-to-day events and are the policymakers’ primary concern at 
that point in time.77 Long-term intelligence is more oriented towards trends and issues 
that are not of immediate concern, but are sufficiently important and may eventually 
make the headlines, especially if it does not get some current attention.78 The 
dissemination of intelligence to the policymakers can be in the form of briefings and 
estimates, basic intelligence, warning intelligence, intelligence for operational support, 
and scientific and technical intelligence. 
a. Briefings  
  Briefings are one of the most common ways of presenting current 
intelligence to policy makers. This direct interaction provides the opportunity for the 
analyst to gauge policy makers’ preferences and, in the absence of a proper feedback 
mechanism, to evaluate the extent to which their product is seen as valuable.79 
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b. Estimates 
 Estimates are judgments about the likely course of events and their impact 
on the state.80 An estimate serves two important functions.81 First, it indication of where 
a major issue or trend will be in the future through a projection in time which can be a 
period of several years. Second and more importantly, it is a combined product that 
presents the views of multiple agencies in the intelligence community. 
c. Basic Intelligence 
This refers to data–biographic, geographic, military, economic, 
demographic, social, and political–that have been compiled and presented in the form of 
monographs, in-depth studies, atlases, maps, and order-of-battle summaries.82 
d. Warning Intelligence 
Primarily a responsibility of military intelligence, warning intelligence is 
giving advance warning to policy makers about events that might require a policy 
response that would require involvement by the armed forces.83 
e. Intelligence for Operational Support 
This pertains to intelligence to support the planning and conduct of a 
specific operation.84 
f. Scientific and Technical Intelligence 
This refers to the assessment of developments by foreign nations or groups 
in the field of technology and the capabilities and performance of their weapon 
systems.85 
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C. OPERATING WITHIN A DEMOCRATIC FRAMEWORK 
The 2008 terrorist attack in India is a bitter and harsh reminder of the increasing 
severity of terrorist acts in recent decades. States where serious acts of terrorism have 
been staged find it very difficult to battle an invisible enemy who uses an asymmetrical 
modus operandi. Consequently, and for a number of practical reasons, this emerging 
threat calls into question the efficiency and effectiveness of the conventional means 
traditionally used by intelligence agencies.86 Terrorist cells are very difficult to locate by 
conventional technical collection systems that use satellites, as they present a smaller 
imagery target.87 Their signals communications are harder to intercept with signals 
intelligence sensors, not only because they offer much smaller signatures, but more 
specifically because some terrorist organizations have developed strategies to evade 
interception.88 The collection of intelligence on terrorist cells using human resources is 
not an easy task. It is difficult to penetrate radical groups because potential members are 
carefully scrutinized and membership restricted to certain categories of individuals, based 
on specific criteria such as race, ethnicity and religious affiliation.89 However, this does 
not imply that intelligence agencies should resort to practices that undermine the 
democratic principles that they are expected to uphold. There is a need for a legal 
framework and executive, legislative, judicial, and internal mechanisms to ensure that 
security intelligence agencies operate within a democratic framework and are accountable 
to the civil society. 
1. Legal Framework 
Legal recognition is one thing, but most importantly, the legal charter must define 
the role and responsibilities of the agencies–what they can and cannot do–along with 
mechanisms for overseeing their work, procedures for designating the agency head, 
duties of the officer in charge and his reporting channel, the staffing and recruitment 
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process, budget allocation, provisions making agency officials liable to judicial 
prosecution in case of abuses, and procedures for civil society access to government 
information.90 Security intelligence agencies acquire a legal status and legitimacy when 
they are established and granted statutory powers under legal provisions. For example, in 
the United Kingdom the 1989 Security Service Act legally recognized the existence of 
MI5, while the Intelligence Service Act of 1994 granted legal status to MI6 and GCHQ.91  
In the United States, intelligence agencies do not operate in isolation, but are part 
of an intelligence community92 established by the National Security Act of 1947. The 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 defines the members of the 
U.S. intelligence community and outlines their role and responsibilities. These roles, all 
designed to protect U.S. security interests, are to collect and analyze information related 
to international terrorism, drug trafficking, hostile activities by foreign powers, 
organizations, persons and their agents, along with activities by foreign intelligence 
services.93 Laws also govern the use of wiretaps by intelligence agencies for the 
collection of foreign intelligence, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),94 and 
the right of access to government information under certain conditions granted by the 
Freedom of Information Act.95 
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2. Executive Control 
Matei argues that defining the legal parameters for security intelligence agencies’ 
operations is not sufficient to control their behavior and make them accountable for their 
actions.96 Consequently, they require effective control from the executive branch, with 
whom they work most closely, to set their priorities and monitor how they execute their 
tasks. For example, in the U.S., the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board is 
responsible for reviewing the performance of all intelligence agencies, the Intelligence 
Oversight Board reviews oversight by inspectors general and the general counsels of the 
various intelligence agencies, and the Office of Management and Budget reviews 
intelligence budgets in line with policies and priorities.97 In contrast, in the U.K., the 
ministerial responsibility for the Security Service is under the Home Secretary, who is 
directly responsible to Parliament for all activities undertaken by MI5. The Service has to 
request authorization from the minister for actions where civil liberties and human rights 
are at issue.98 It is important to note that the Director General of MI5 is “named in law as 
having day-to-day responsibility” and there are specific provisions in law to ensure that 
the agency remains politically neutral. Furthermore, the Security Service is required to 
submit an annual report to the prime minister and the secretary of state.99  
3. Legislative Control 
Given that the executive is the most important client of the intelligence 
community, there is a need to balance the power of the executive branch with a 
legislative control.100 In the U.S., Congressional oversight was implemented in the 
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aftermath of the Watergate scandal in the 1970’s. The Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) 
have a Congressional mandate to oversee the work of the intelligence community and to 
allocate resources.101 Legislative control is required over resources allocated to 
intelligence agencies for proper accountability of public funds, but also to ensure that the 
agencies operate to further the national interest and comply with the rule of law.102 
In the U.K., legislative oversight is more recent, with the Intelligence Services 
Act 1994 establishing the Intelligence and Security Committee to oversee and manage the 
security and intelligence services by auditing their expenses and reviewing their 
policies.103  
4. Judicial Control 
A control mechanism that can investigate complaints is required to ensure that he 
security intelligence agencies do not violate citizens’ civil rights and liberties by abusing 
their special powers with intrusive or covert surveillance and searches.104 Indeed, there is 
a need to appraise the work of the intelligence agencies against the legal framework.105 In 
the U.K., the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 assigns judicial 
commissioners the responsibility of investigating the ministers’ issue and authorization of 
warrants allowing the security and intelligence services to intercept mail and 
telecommunications operations. And the Investigatory Powers Tribunal has the 
competency to investigate public complaints against the intelligence services for alleged 
violations of civil rights.106 
In the U.S. system of government, the main function of the judiciary is to 
safeguard the rights of individuals enshrined in the Constitution against abuses from the 
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executive and the legislative branches.107 In a number of cases, the Supreme Court has 
used its constitutional authority to defend the civil rights and liberties of individuals in 
matters of national security, in particular in Hamdi v Rumsfeld and in Rasul v Bush.108  
To ensure that defendants have a right to a fair trial, the courts now allow classified 
evidence to be adduced in compliance with the procedures set down in the Classified 
Information Procedures Act.109  
5. Internal Control 
Some democratic states created apparatus within their intelligence community to 
enhance the oversight mechanism. In the U.S., this includes the appointment of inspectors 
general and general counsels to oversee certain security intelligence activities, the use of 
competitive analysis to generate alternative interpretations, and training facilities to 
enhance the professionalism of the staff. Also, policy makers created multiple agencies 
within the intelligence community to prevent the intelligence function from being 
monopolized by a single agency or individual.110 
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has looked at the role and responsibilities of intelligence agencies 
from a very broad perspective. Its main purpose is to identify their main characteristics, 
the different activities that must be carried out in each of the four stages of the 
intelligence process, as well as the legal framework and control mechanisms that must be 
implemented to ensure that they operate within the rule of law. To develop the CTU of 
the Republic of Mauritius, the lessons learned would be combined with other factors to 
be identified in forthcoming chapters.  
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III. THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
In the United States, the intelligence agencies do not operate in isolation, but are 
part of an intelligence community111 established by the National Security Act of 1947. 
This community is responsible for the collection and analysis of information related to 
international terrorism, drug trafficking, hostile activities conducted by foreign powers, 
organizations, persons and their agents, as well as activities undertaken by foreign 
intelligence services, in order to protect the U.S. security interests.112  
Since 2004, there has been a reorganization of the U.S. intelligence community, 
arguably as a result of three major issues.113 First, reorganization was a response to the 
terrorist attacks of September 2001. Second, it was the result of the implementation of a 
number of recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Report. Lastly, it was a 
consequence of the apparently erroneous intelligence on the existence of weapons of 
mass destruction in Iraq. With the implementation of the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the U.S. intelligence community can be divided into 
three main categories of intelligence agencies, under the central coordination of the 
Director of National Intelligence: military intelligence agencies, departmental 
intelligence agencies other than the Department of Defense, and one independent 
intelligence agency.  
This chapter is devoted to a succinct description of the office of the Director of 
National Intelligence, the three main categories of intelligence agencies, and the various 
functional mission support units that they control. The focus is on those agencies most 
relevant to this study, although other agencies are discussed in order to provide adequate 
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background information about the U.S. intelligence community. Ultimately, the aim of 
this chapter is to identify organizations that could serve as models for the Counter 
Terrorism Unit of the Republic of Mauritius. 
A. OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE  
The post of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) was created in response to 
recommendations from the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United 
States. The purpose of the post is to promote intelligence sharing between the agencies of 
the U.S. intelligence community. The DNI is now the head of this community and the 
principal advisor to the President and the National Security Council (NSC) on 
intelligence related to national security.114 In a nutshell, the director oversees all U.S. 
intelligence agencies, supervises the collection and dissemination of intelligence across 
the intelligence community, and is responsible for protecting intelligence sources and 
methods.115 The office of the DNI includes a headquarters staff as well as the National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the National Intelligence Council (NIC), the National 
Counterproliferation Center (NCPC), and the National Counterintelligence Executive 
(NCIX).   
1.  The National Counterterrorism Center 
The NCTC is responsible for analyzing all intelligence matters related to 
terrorism and counterterrorism, except those that relate to purely domestic terrorism, and 
acts as the principal adviser to the DNI on these issues. Although the DNI has the overall 
responsibility for the NCTC, the director of the NCTC has another major responsibility, 
the strategic planning of counterterrorism operations. In this role he is authorized to 
report directly to the President of the United Sates.116   
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2. The National Intelligence Council  
The NIC is composed of National Intelligence Officers (NIOs), who are senior 
officials responsible for overseeing and coordinating intelligence work across the 
intelligence community in their assigned specialty areas. The main roles of the NIC are to 
conduct mid-term and long-term strategic analysis for the DNI and to produce National 
Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) on issues of serious concern to the intelligence community 
in general.117  
 3. The National Counterproliferation Center  
The NCPC is responsible for the coordination of intelligence activities on the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related delivery systems.118 It is a 
smaller organization than the NCTC, without the operational planning responsibilities of 
the terrorism center. It generally does not produce its own intelligence products, but 
rather serves as a coordination mechanism for the rest of the intelligence community’s 
work on WMD issues.     
4. The National Counterintelligence Executive  
The focus of the NCIX, as its name suggests, is counterintelligence.119 This 
organization employs counterintelligence specialists from a large number of agencies 
throughout the national intelligence and security communities to exploit and counter 
intelligence activities directed against U.S. interests.120 
B. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES 
The military intelligence agencies fall under the command of the Department of 
Defense (DoD), with the main mission of supporting military operations at both the 
regional and tactical command level by providing indications and warnings of 
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forthcoming attacks and the relevant intelligence support.121 To meet these requirements, 
the DoD has under its direct command and control a number of agencies and units, 
including the National Security Agency (NSA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the National Reconnaissance Office 
(NRO), and the service intelligence units.122  
1. National Security Agency   
The main missions of the NSA are to protect the U.S. National Security 
information systems and to collect and disseminate foreign signals intelligence. Its fields 
of expertise include cryptanalysis, cryptography, and foreign language analysis.123 
Although its budget and personnel totals are not publicly available, it is understood to be 
the largest of all the U.S. intelligence agencies.   
2. Defense Intelligence Agency  
The DIA is a combat support agency and a very important component of the U.S. 
intelligence community. Its main mission is to provide intelligence on military topics and 
other areas as required to support U.S. military commanders and operational forces. 
Much of this effort is focused overseas to help U.S. forces counter threats and challenges 
in combat zones.124   
3. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency  
The NGA is responsible for the processing and exploitation of imagery 
intelligence and for developing map-based intelligence solutions for U.S. national 
defense and homeland security, and for the enhancement of navigational safety. It also 
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assists federal agencies and first responders involved in disaster relief and homeland 
defense operations by providing geospatial intelligence data, products, and analyses.125 
4. National Reconnaissance Office  
The mission of the NRO is to design, build, and oversee the launch of overhead 
reconnaissance systems that can be used to advise the DoD on potential aggression by 
foreign military forces, monitor programs related to WMDs, enforce arms control treaties 
and assess the impact of manmade and natural disasters.126  
5. Service Intelligence Units 
The service intelligence units of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps 
are responsible for collecting and analyzing intelligence to support their respective 
services. These service intelligence agencies are large organizations, often employing 
thousands of people.      
C. DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Justice, the 
Department of State, the Department of Energy (DoE), and the Department of Treasury 
are the five main departments with intelligence agencies that participate in the 
intelligence community. The agencies within these departments are responsible for the 
collection of intelligence in various fields to safeguard the United States from domestic 
and international security threats. 
1. Department of Homeland Security 
Although DHS is responsible for a wide variety of homeland security functions, 
its founding purpose and main responsibility is to prevent and deter terrorist attacks.127 It 
plays a vital role in the merging of state and local law enforcement and intelligence 
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information on terrorism related issues within the U.S. territory.128 In this context, and 
primarily due to recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, the DHS has 
established the State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiatives. This program aims to 
build a partnership with state and local Fusion Centers engaged in a variety of missions, 
including all-crimes and all-hazards as well as counterterrorism. The concept of the 
fusion centers is to create a platform whereby different agencies contribute resources, 
expertise and information to enhance their effectiveness and efficiency in responding to 
criminal and terrorist activity.  
2. Federal Bureau of Investigation  
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), part of the Department of Justice, is 
primarily responsible for the enforcement of criminal laws and protecting the United 
States from terrorists and foreign intelligence agencies while upholding the civil liberties 
of American citizens. As far as terrorism is concerned, the bureau has highly specialized 
and technical cells, Joint Terrorism Task Forces, in 106 cities nationwide. These 
interagency task forces are composed of investigators, analysts, linguists, Special 
Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) experts, and other specialists from a large number of U.S. 
law enforcement and intelligence agencies.129  
3. Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) of the Department of State is 
responsible for the analysis of events and trends that could have significant effects on the 
foreign policy of the United States and its national security interests.130 Although INR is 
one of the smaller agencies of the U.S. intelligence community, it is widely regarded as 
one of the most effective. It is primarily an analytical organization, with relatively few 
intelligence collection assets. It does receive reporting from Defense Attaches and other 
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human resources operating in various embassies and relies also on Foreign Service 
officers and Civil Service specialists with in-depth in-country experience.131  
4. Office of Intelligence  
The Office of Intelligence of the Department of Energy provides technical 
intelligence expertise in matters related to nuclear weapons and proliferation, energy 
security, science and technology, and nuclear energy, safety, and waste.132 It is also 
responsible for coordinating the intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the 
different national laboratories that operate within the United States.133 
5. Office of Terrorism and Illicit Finance  
The Office of Terrorism and Illicit Finance of the Department of Treasury is 
responsible for protecting the national financial system from illicit financial transactions 
that support terrorism, crime and narcotics.134  
6. Office of National Security Intelligence 
The Office of National Security Intelligence (ONSI) of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) under the Department of Justice supports the DEA with 
intelligence to enforce the controlled substance laws and regulations of the United States 
and to assist the intelligence community in protecting national security.135 
D. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
Despite recent changes within the U.S. intelligence community, the CIA remains 
the single most important element of the IC, with all-source analytical capabilities that 
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cover the whole world outside U.S. territorial boundaries.136 It is responsible for the 
production of national security intelligence for the President, the NSC, and senior U.S. 
policymakers.137 The Director of the CIA is also the National Human Intelligence 
Manager, responsible for managing HUMINT programs across the IC.138 As laid out in 
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the CIA Director now 
reports to the DNI.  It is important to note, however, that the DNI does not tend to 
exercise operational control over the CIA, and the CIA has retained considerable 
autonomy.    
The main operating elements of the CIA are the National Clandestine Service 
(NCS), the Directorate of Intelligence (DI), the Directorate of Science and Technology 
(DS&T), and the Directorate of Support (DS). The next section briefly describes each of 
these.   
1. The National Clandestine Service  
The NCS is responsible for the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence–
primarily human intelligence–that in principle cannot be obtained by other means, and 
also for counterintelligence to protect U.S classified intelligence activities and institutions 
from penetration and disruption by foreign intelligence services and individuals.139 
2. The Directorate of Intelligence  
The DI is the agency’s primary analytical arm, with expertise in areas ranging 
from foreign military issues to matters of foreign policy and terrorism.  The DI is 
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emanating from various sources and methods, including human intelligence reports, 
satellite photography, open source information, sophisticated sensors, and information 
from U.S. personnel working overseas.140 
3. The Directorate of Science and Technology  
The DS&T is the technical arm of the CIA, providing the agency with scientific 
and engineering capabilities to resolve critical intelligence issues.141 
4. The Directorate of Support  
The DS is responsible for the administrative and logistic support of all the 
agency’s elements, including acquisitions, communications, facilities services, financial 
management, information technology, medical services, logistics, and the security of 
information, facilities, and technology.142 
E. CONCLUSION 
This analysis shows that the various agencies of the United States intelligence 
community work for different patrons and policymakers. Consequently, they are 
organized, equipped, and mandated to collect specific types of intelligence within their 
own spheres of activity. The responsibility of the DNI is to fuse together the intelligence 
produced from these various sources, both to compensate for the shortcomings of each 
agency and to benefit from their combined strength.143  Of prime relevance to this thesis, 
there are a number of entities within the IC that bring together different agencies and 
capabilities to accomplish specific goals.  The key entities for the purpose of this thesis 
are the National Counterterrorism Center under the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, the Joint Terrorism Task Forces led by the FBI, and the state and local 
Fusion Centers coordinated by the Department of Homeland Security. An in-depth 
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analysis of these organizations focused on their organizational structures, roles, 
responsibilities, and procedures for inter-agency cooperation, could serve as a structural 




IV. UNITED STATES COUNTERTERRORISM MODELS 
The “Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States” points out that among the major flaws that allowed the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks to happen are the existence of fault lines within the government between foreign 
and domestic intelligence, and between and within the agencies of the intelligence 
community, especially when it comes to the managing and sharing of information.144 In 
the past decade the government has adopted a strategy that rests on the centralization of 
resources to achieve unity of effort,145 making countering terrorism the first priority in 
the U.S.146 To identify key points that might help organize the CTU of the Republic of 
Mauritius, this chapter examines three counter terrorism organizations developed or 
reshaped by recommendations from the 9/11 Commission: the National Counter 
Terrorism Center, Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and Intelligence Fusion Centers.    
A. THE NATIONAL COUNTER TERRORISM CENTER 
The NCTC was established under the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act to warn of potential terrorist threats on the U.S. To fulfill that 
responsibility, the center is organized as a centralized body for intelligence with well-
defined roles and responsibilities. It operates under the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence; its director is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the 
Senate.147 Since its creation, it has brought together more than thirty different 
intelligence, military, law enforcement and homeland security networks. It is staffed by 
analysts who are fully conversant with the organizational structure, role and 
responsibilities of many government agencies. In a nutshell, it is basically the same 
concept put forward by the President in 2003 when the Terrorist Threat Integration 
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Center was established to merge and analyze all information on probable threats at a 
single location.148 The NCTC created a platform for effective collection of information 
from government agencies and open sources. This allows improved analysis and sharing 
of information related to terrorism. To fulfill that responsibility, the center has access to 
all the intelligence agencies’ databases and can also co-opt government resources to 
supplement its own intelligence gathering process.149 
The primary mission of the NCTC is to integrate information from all available 
sources about terrorist issues and ultimately, through efficient analysis, to provide 
policymakers with timely and actionable intelligence to plan appropriate responses. 
However, it also conducts a variety of specific interrelated tasks to support the all-source 
analysis process. Firstly, it is responsible for maintaining a central database, the Terrorist 
Identities Datamart Environment, which can be shared within the intelligence 
community. The database includes information on known and suspected terrorists and 
international terrorist groups, focusing on their motivations, capabilities and the networks 
that support their illegal activities.150 Secondly, daily briefings and situation reports 
though secure video teleconferences and regular voice and electronic contact allows the 
center to keep the major intelligence agencies informed round the clock on the prevailing 
threat level and provides the capability to track incident information. Thirdly, the center 
is responsible for strategic operational planning for counterterrorism efforts in liaison 
with all other institutions dealing with national security. Lastly, although not mandated to 
direct the execution of operations, the NCTC is responsible for assigning operational 
responsibilities to lead agencies for counterterrorism activities.151 
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B. THE JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE 
The joint task force concept was first introduced in 1979 in New York City as a 
solution for the need for a concerted response by federal and state law enforcement to a 
rise in the number of bank robberies.152 Having proved an effective model, the idea was 
extended to the counterterrorism program against Puerto Rican nationalists and the New 
Afrikaans Freedom Fighters153 and a task force of members of the New York Police 
Department (NYPD) and FBI investigators was established to investigate cases related to 
terrorism.154 Over the years, this joint task force was expanded to include representatives 
from other local and federal authorities such as the U.S. Marshals Service, the U.S. 
Department of State’s Diplomatic Security Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
Firearms (ATF), the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the New York State Police, 
the New York/New Jersey Port Authority Police Department, and the U.S. Secret 
Service.155 Subsequently, the model was replicated in other states. 
Prior to September 11, 2001, there were 35 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) 
in the U.S.156  This number increased significantly after the attacks, when the FBI 
implemented numerous reforms with the goal of becoming more proactive, flexible and 
intelligence-driven in dealing with terrorism.157 Today there are 106 locally based JTTFs 
led by the Department of Justice and the FBI. They include investigators, analysts, 
linguists, SWAT experts, and other specialists.158  
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The JTTF is responsible for the operational and investigative duties of the law 
enforcement community to prevent acts of terrorism and investigate terrorist related 
crimes.159 A number of practical measures have been implemented to maximize its 
efficiency and effectiveness. There is a written memorandum of understanding between 
agencies in the JTTF.160  The FBI is responsible for expenses like officer overtime, 
vehicles, gas, cell phones, and office costs that are incurred by the state and local 
departments in the JTTF. For proper command and control, a supervisory special agent 
experienced in counterterrorism investigations oversees the daily work of the task force. 
Each task force is basically composed of FBI special agents with expertise in domestic 
and international terrorism, along with federal, state, and local law enforcement officers 
who bring a variety of skills to a single organizational structure.  The national security 
effort is bolstered by including police detectives with access to local criminal databases, 
state police or highway patrol who have statewide jurisdiction, ATF agents with specific 
skills and related databases, and officers of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement with expertise in international terrorism investigations. Also, task force 
coordinators are appointed to manage administrative functions and to serve as the first 
line investigator liaison between the federal, state, and local officers serving in the JTTF. 
Additionally, it has been recommended that personnel should be attached to the JTTF on 
a fulltime basis to ensure commitment, availability, and a focus on the mission. All 
members, irrespective of their parent agency, are on the same footing, assigned the same 
work load, and encouraged to develop their own seals, patches and jackets to create 
cohesiveness and enhance esprit de corps. Because the center deals with national security 
information, all officers assigned to the JTTF have top secret security clearances.161  
To summarize, the concept of bringing several agencies under a single roof to 
strategically analyze domestic and international terrorism threats can be beneficial to both 
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the FBI and the law enforcement agencies.162 When multiple agencies work together, the 
increased dialogue and improved relationships enhance information sharing. The 
expertise of the seasoned FBI officers who oversee the work of the JTTF members helps 
them further develop their investigative techniques and broaden their knowledge of 
counterterrorism and national security. The JTTF members bring additional expertise 
based on their knowledge of local jurisdictions and street level experience from prior 
assignments. In addition, the parent agencies derive benefits from the partnership. During 
their JTTF tenure, officers gain specialized training and experience managing complex 
investigations. They bring these skills and knowledge home when they return to their 
parent units. Parent agencies also benefit by having real-time representatives who can 
provide information that might be useful for disrupting terrorist networks in the local 
community.163 To summarize, this partnership effectively maximizes federal, state, and 
local law enforcement resources164 as each agency contributes its own capabilities, 
experience, and equipment in a concerted effort to prevent acts of terrorism.165 
C. INTELLIGENCE FUSION CENTERS 
The establishment of Intelligence Fusion Centers is a result of the Homeland 
Security Advisory Council Intelligence and Information Sharing Working Group’s final 
report. After 9/11, it was revealed that state and local law enforcement officers had 
encountered some of the terrorists involved in the attacks.  Unfortunately, legal 
provisions that regulate information sharing and bureaucratic roadblocks between state 
and local enforcement agencies prevented disparate pieces of information from being 
shared. Instead they were closely kept in the databases of the individual intelligence and 
law enforcement agencies. As a result, the intelligence community did not connect the 
dots and frame the bigger picture that might have prevented these attacks. It became clear 
that removing barriers between state and local law enforcement agencies could improve 
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information sharing, so in 2003 the Department of Homeland Security initiated the 
establishment of Intelligence Fusion Centers by letting homeland security grant funds be 
used for preventive measures to combat terrorism.166  
Intelligence Fusion Centers167 are central locations where local, state and federal 
employees work in close proximity to receive, integrate, and analyze criminal and federal 
intelligence as well as public and private sector data related to homeland security and 
counterterrorism.168 The centers emphasize the potential for state and local enforcement 
and public safety agencies to make important contributions to the overall strategy of 
protecting domestic security. Because their work puts them in close contact with people 
and events, state, local and tribal law enforcement, first responders, and other private and 
public sector entities are far better equipped to collect information and identify emerging 
threats. For example, local law enforcement officials are better placed than other agencies 
to detect anomalies within their communities and to be the “ears and eyes” of the larger 
national security community.  They have the option of stopping the illegal activity, or, if 
they take a more intelligence-led approach and work with the FBI, they can exploit it as 
an opportunity to extract maximum information.  
Most of the 72 state and local Intelligence Fusion Centers were created by 
bringing together intelligence-based units with the analytical components of the states’ 
law enforcement agencies. Most of them are located in Urban Area Security Initiative 
regions, which are basically large cities with high population density and numerous 
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structures that are tied to their specific roles and responsibilities: counterterrorism, 
prevention, response, recovery, or a combination of these.169 Nonetheless, they all have 
some characteristics in common. 
The centers all operate within a legal framework under federal regulations in 
addition to applicable state policies, laws and regulations.170 To ensure that the use of 
private sector data, proactive approaches to criminal offences, and intelligence collection 
is conducted in strict compliance with privacy rights and civil liberties, officers in the 
Intelligence Fusion Centers are provided Technical Assistance Training by the 
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice.171 There is an 
oversight mechanism in the form of a board of governance that oversees the work of the 
Intelligence Fusion Centers to ensure that they operate within their legal parameters.172  
Though initially created with a primary focus on counterterrorism, today a large number 
of Intelligence Fusion Centers are adopting an all-crime approach because of the nexus 
between terrorism and some traditional crimes. Some criminal activities such as drug 
trafficking, money laundering, bank robbery and illegal weapons trafficking have been 
and are still used to finance terrorist operations. Though most Intelligence Fusion Centers 
perform both prevention and response functions, the greater focus is on preventing and 
mitigating threats before they materialize. Most centers are involved in the analytical 
processing of information and threat assessments to support operations and 
investigations. The few that are under the jurisdiction of a single state police or bureau of 
investigation and staffed predominantly by sworn law enforcement officials have more 
operational capabilities.173 To enhance the sharing of information, the DHS has set up a 
network to connect the Homeland Security Data Network and the state and local 
agencies.174 
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Besides the integration of state and local law enforcement and public safety 
agencies into a single structure, Intelligence Fusion Centers have also established joint 
partnerships with federal agencies such as Joint Terrorism Task Forces and the FBI’s 
Field Intelligence Groups.  This collaboration gives them access to the FBI information 
system and other facilities where classified information is stored, used, discussed or 
processed.175 Intelligence Fusion Center personnel are issued different levels of security 
clearances depending on the tasks they perform and their need for access to classified 
information.176  
In short, it appears that information sharing between local, state, and federal 
agencies is greatly enhanced by the Intelligence Fusion Centers, and the fusion process of 
turning information and intelligence into actionable knowledge is helping to mitigate the 
threat from terrorism, with state, local, and national benefits.  
D. KEY POINTS 
An analysis of the three counterterrorism organizations shows that a number of 
issues, including staffing, interagency cooperation, secrecy, mission, and legal 
framework, are fundamental for a unit to consider in its efforts to professionalize its 
service and improve its effectiveness.  
1. Human Resources 
The collection of raw information and its conversion into finished intelligence is a 
complex process. It involves mastering various types of methods and techniques for the 
collection of primary data, processing this information to convert it into the format 
required for analysis, separating pertinent facts from the flood of information, and 
applying good judgment and insights to uncover meaning and significance so policy 
makers can craft the appropriate response. All these steps directly or indirectly require the 
use of human resources. Accordingly, intelligence agencies must have highly qualified 
staff with the appropriate expertise. They must be employed on a full time basis to ensure 
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their commitment, availability, and focus on the mission. It is advisable to recruit from 
other government agencies, as experience and knowledge of how other agencies operate  
is an important asset. At agency level, it is important to have a mix of agents with 
expertise in both domestic and international terrorism. Also, all agents must follow a 
standard training curriculum to improve their technical expertise and to facilitate 
interaction among staff within and between agencies. Finally, an environment that 
promotes team spirit will help everyone work toward a unified organizational goal. 
2. Interagency Cooperation 
Interagency coordination and cooperation within the intelligence community in 
the fight against terrorism is a prerequisite for effective, efficient, and timely response. 
This can be achieved in a number of ways. There is a need at organizational level for 
mechanism to coordinate with liaison officers from other intelligence agencies for 
effective information sharing. The implementation of a standard operating procedure 
across agencies can create a platform for local agency participation and encourage 
operational best practices. The use of a common operating system for intelligence 
management can facilitate access to all available databases from the various intelligence 
agencies. A memorandum of understanding to regulate the exchange of law enforcement 
and intelligence information between the different agencies provides a necessary 
safeguard so the dissemination of intelligence does not infringe on privacy and civil 
liberties. Also, there is a need for standardization of classification designations and 
dissemination guidelines to avoid over-classification of intelligence, an obstacle to 
information sharing. Lastly, a feedback mechanism on the information provided is a 
prerequisite to make future cooperation more effective.  
3. Secrecy of Intelligence 
Intelligence is all about secrecy. It encompasses the secrecy of information that 
one holds and wants to keep secret, as well as the secrecy of the means that one uses to 
find out what others are keeping secret.177 Data obtained through cooperation with the 
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private sector must be protected from industrial espionage that would expose weaknesses 
to competitors, while information gathered from the public sector must not infringe on 
privacy and civil liberties. For a repository of intelligence pertaining to national security, 
there is first a need to acquire the necessary equipment and physical infrastructure for 
receiving and storing classified intelligence. Secondly, a system of security clearances 
must be implemented to limit access to classified information to those who are entitled to 
receive it.  
4. Proactive Measures  
Despite the fact that most counterterrorism agencies do perform both prevention 
and response functions,  the focus must be more on preventive work to detect a threat 
before it materializes. This can involve public awareness initiatives, like campaigns in 
schools, community forums and debates on terrorism and security measures. Prevention 
also requires a close working relationship with the security agencies responsible for 
protecting critical infrastructure, to assess its vulnerability to terrorist threats and advise 
the agencies on protective measures. 
5. Legal Framework 
Legal recognition is a prerequisite in a democratic society to ensure the legitimacy 
of its intelligence agencies.  At the very onset, there is a need for a legal charter to define 
the role and responsibilities of the agencies and the mechanisms for oversight of their 
work, the selection procedures for designating the head of the agency, the duties of the 
officer in charge and his reporting channel, the staffing and recruitment process, budget 
allocation, and provisions that make officials of the agency liable to judicial prosecution 
in case of abuses, and that lays down the procedures for the civil society to have access to 
government information.178 Secondly, intelligence agencies must operate under 
democratic civilian control in order to make them legitimate in the eyes of the public. 
Thirdly, there is need for an official acknowledgement of the existence of the various 
 
                                                 
178 Bruneau and Matei, “Intelligence in the Developing Democracies: The Quest for Transparency 
and Effectiveness,” 764. 
 53 
agencies in the intelligence community. Lastly, the intelligence agencies must be granted 
statutory charters through legislative acts expressed in formal documents that specify the 
parameters within which they can operate. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has analyzed the three main U.S. counterterrorism organizations of 
that share some similarities with the CTU of the Republic of Mauritius. Its main purpose 
is to identify the key factors that are sine qua non for ensuring effectiveness and 
efficiency in combating terrorism. The concluding chapter will combine all the key issues 
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V. ORGANIZING THE COUNTER TERRORISM UNIT OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF MAURITIUS: IMPLEMENTATION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
In response to the rise of terrorism in the South West Indian Ocean and its 
potential to threaten national stability and security, the government of the Republic of 
Mauritius recently established a Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU) under the supervision of 
the National Counter Terrorism Committee (NCTC). The mission of this unit is to collect 
and analyze all terrorism-related intelligence, and ultimately disseminate the finished 
product to the country’s law and order apparatus.  This agency, which is not yet fully 
operational, will be vital for integrating national counter terrorism efforts and strategies. 
Pooling all available resources and bringing multiple strands of expertise under one roof 
is the standard response of most democracies facing the scourge of terrorism.  It will 
require an integrated response based on a judicious mix of the state’s defense, diplomatic, 
intelligence and law-enforcement capabilities. However, it is important to realize that this 
endeavor will require significant organizational and legal changes. 
This concluding chapter focuses on the implementation of the key points that have 
emerged in the study. The goal is to provide lessons learned and analysis to help 
effectively organize the CTU so it can fulfill its mission to proactively combat all forms 
of terrorism so as to make the Republic of Mauritius more resilient and secure. First I 
consider the practices that must be adopted to ensure that the unit operates within the 
parameters of the rule of law and without infringing on civil liberties. I then will look at 
the mechanisms to promote effective collection, sharing, and dissemination of 
intelligence among the agencies in the intelligence community. The third section is 
devoted to the protection of classified information against any form of leakage. I then 
focus on the type of structure that will enable the CTU to effectively and efficiently fulfill 
its mission. Lastly, I consider how the CTU can contribute to making the Republic of 
Mauritius more proactive in combating the threat of terrorism. 
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A. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
For the CTU to be legitimate under the law, there is a need at the very onset to 
legally recognize the Cabinet decision that established its creation in 2009. This official 
legal document must define the role and responsibilities of the Unit as well as the 
parameters within which it can operate. There must be a mechanism to ensure that the 
CTU operates within a democratic framework and is accountable to civil society. This 
section briefly describes these three requirements. 
1. Legal Recognition 
This can be in the form of an act of parliament that legally recognizes the 
existence of the CTU, much as the Intelligence Service Act 1994 granted legal status to 
the MI6 and GCHQ in the U.K and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004 established the office of the Director of National Intelligence in the U.S.  
2. Role and Responsibilities of the CTU 
The role of the CTU is to collect and analyze all terrorism-related intelligence and 
disseminate the finished product to the country’s law and order apparatus. For this 
purpose, I would argue that the CTU should not be involved in field investigations or 
field operations and consequently does not require the legal powers and authority to 
arrest, detain, interview, or effect searches. In fact, it would be more comparable to the 
intelligence agencies in the United Kingdom where there is a separation between security 
and policing. Security agencies in the U.K. do not have powers of arrest or prosecute and 
they need to work closely with the police and Crown Prosecution Service.179 This adds 
another level of control and prevents abuse of authority as the police ensure that these 
actions are lawfully executed. 
3. Accountability and Oversight 
Rendering the CTU accountable for its actions can be achieved by having 
executive, legislative, and judicial control over the activities of the unit. 
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a. Executive Control 
From an administrative perspective, the CTU falls under the Secretary of 
Home Affairs, who chairs the National Counter Terrorism Committee that oversees the 
work of the CTU. As this individual is directly responsible to the Prime Minister of the 
Republic of Mauritius, I would argue that there is a need to implement executive control 
at the Cabinet level to sanction his actions, especially when the authorization to conduct 
certain types of actions is required, such as those requiring access to privileged 
information. Indeed, as per the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002, the minister 
responsible for national security has the authority to direct any communication service 
provider, including postal and telecommunications services, to retain communications 
data for a specified period of time.180  
b. Legislative Control 
Recognizing that policy makers will be the main customers of the CTU, 
there is a need to counterbalance the powers of the executive by legislative control to 
ensure that agency resources are used only for legitimate purposes and consistent with its 
mandate. This can take the form of a committee of parliamentarians responsible for 
overseeing the work of the CTU. This select committee must have the relevant power to 
perform their control function, including authority to request specific documents and the 
ability to liaise with the Director of the CTU or his staff to gain information about 
activities of the unit. This will create a bridge between secret and the political worlds and 
make the organization more transparent and accountable.  
c. Judicial Control 
For a number of reasons that will be developed later in this chapter, I 
foresee that the members of the CTU are likely to come from the Mauritius Police Force. 
Consequently, they will have a whole range of powers granted to them under the Police 
Act and the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002. Under Section 9(1) (c) of the Police Act, 
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any member of the Mauritius Police Force is empowered to take all lawful measures 
including the use of force as may be necessary for apprehending persons who have 
committed, or who are reasonably suspected of having committed, criminal offences.181 
For this purpose they can exercise their powers of arrest even without a warrant if they 
have just cause to believe that the suspect has committed or was intending to commit a 
crime.182  
With regards to detention, any person arrested under reasonable suspicion 
of having committed an offence under Section 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12 or 15 of the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act 2002 may be detained in police custody under the instruction of a police 
officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police for a period not exceeding 36 
hours from his arrest, without having access to any person other than a police officer not 
below the rank of Inspector, or a Government Medical Officer.183 The main purpose here 
is to prevent the person from alerting of other suspects who are not yet in police custody. 
The police have only the obligation to keep a video recording of the detained person 
during his period of detention in such manner as to constitute an accurate, continuous and 
uninterrupted record of the whole period of his detention, including his movements, 
interviews, and statements. 
Consequently, there is a need for oversight of the powers of the CTU by 
the judicial apparatus of the country to ensure that the CTU operates within the rule of 
law. This can be achieved by the appointment of judicial commissioners created by 
appropriate legislation and vested with the powers necessary to execute their 
investigatory task of protecting civil liberties.  
B. INTERAGENCY COOPERATION  
According to the concept paper from the Home Affairs Division, the mission of 
the CTU is to collect and analyze terrorism-related intelligence for use by the law and 
order apparatus. It is obvious that the CTU is expected to be more like an analytical 
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structure than a tactical unit with agents on the ground for collecting information or 
performing investigations. The two main ways for the CTU to gain access to raw 
information are through the Mauritius Police Force and through contacts with other 
agencies and departments in the public and private sectors. 
1. Tapping the Resources of the Mauritius Police Force 
The Mauritius Police Force, the national law enforcement agency, is under the 
command of the Commissioner of Police, who is directly responsible to the Prime 
Minister.   For proper control of Mauritius’s 720 square miles and 1.1 million residents, 
the Mauritius Police Force is organized into Branches and Police Divisions directly 
accountable to the Police Headquarters (PHQ).  
The main Branches are the Special Mobile Force (paramilitary unit), the National 
Coast Guard, the Helicopter Squadron, the Criminal Investigation Department, the Anti 
Drug and Smuggling Unit, and the Special Supporting Unit for public order operations. 
There are six geographical police divisions, Northern, Metropolitan, Western, Eastern, 
Central, and Southern. Each police division is under the command of a divisional 
commander with the rank of Assistant Commissioner of Police who commands a number 
of police stations that depends on the size of its area of responsibility. The division 
commander also has as attachment a small team from specialized branches such as the 
Criminal Investigation Department and the Anti Drug and Smuggling Unit to assist in the 
investigation of crimes within their area of expertise.  
Tapping into the resources of the Mauritius Police Force (MPF) is the most 
efficient and economic process. Because this network already exists and all occurrences 
are reported and monitored at the Police Headquarters level, it would be highly beneficial 
for the CTU to work in close partnership with this coordinating body for access to fresh 
information in real time. 
2.  Appointing Points of Contact  
In addition to its partnership with the Mauritius Police Force, the CTU needs to 
establish a working relationship with some ministries of the government and certain 
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companies and agencies in the private sector. There will be a need to identify those 
entities that have access to firsthand information on security issues, as well as those with 
large databases acquired by virtue of the services that they provide. For example, the 
Ministry of Social Security will be a valuable asset as it has personal details of all people 
born in the country, like date and place of birth, and names of parents, as well as their 
photographs when they were issued the required national identity card. The Ministry of 
Tourism holds a variety of records, including lists of all those who have skipper’s 
licenses and the names of all owners of pleasure crafts. And the Customs Department has 
records of all importers of chemicals as well as their suppliers.   
In my view, once these entities are identified, the government can, for internal 
security purposes, request that each designate two officers (one primary and one 
alternate) to serve as Points of Contact responsible for establishing and maintaining an 
effective information and intelligence sharing network with the CTU. The CTU will then 
need to provide the Points of Contact with the relevant training so they can identify 
intelligence considerations which, when reported, would allow the unit to develop a 
strategic response and comprehensive methodology to combat terrorism. To maintain the 
partnership, the CTU must hold regular inter-agency meetings to discuss current issues 
related to the threat of terrorism.  
With regards to the sharing of data, all government officials are bound by the 
provisions of the Official Secrets Act 1972, while all data controllers184 are bound by the 
Data Protection Act 2004. Therefore, at this juncture, the CTU must establish a protocol 
for sharing of information to ensure that classified data is shared with only those who are 
authorized to have access to it.  
                                                 
184 “[Data controller] means a person who, either alone or jointly with any other person, makes a 
decision with regard to the purposes for which and in the manner in which any personal data are, or are to 
be, processed.” Data Protection Act 2004, Section 2. 
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C. SECRECY OF INTELLIGENCE 
The CTU will be a repository of national security intelligence as it will be storing 
a large amount of classified information185 from the Mauritius Police Force and  other 
agencies and departments. There is a need to classify this information based on its 
significance. Furthermore, the unit must set up a mechanism to control access to 
classified information. And it must acquire the equipment necessary to receive and 
transmit classified information and physical infrastructures for storage. 
1. Classification of Information 
The development and implementation of a proper information classification 
system is a prerequisite to ensure that classified information is not compromised.186 This 
can be achieved by using a standardized system of agreed terminology to define different 
categories of classification. However, in the Republic of Mauritius, the system of 
classification used in the Mauritius Police Force differs from the one used in other 
government ministries. The police department has a two level classification system that 
differentiates between information that is Confidential and Secret. In contrast, at the 
governmental level there is a four level classification system with categories called 
Restricted, Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret. 
Unfortunately, there is no public document that describes the differences between 
these categories except the Standing Orders of the Mauritius Police Force and the 
Government Security Instructions of November 2010. For security reasons and because I 
am bound by the Official Secrets Act of 1972, I cannot disclose the content of these two 
documents. Suffice to say, in simple terms, that the Top Secret label is used strictly for 
information that can be used by hostile elements to neutralize the objectives and 
functions of institutions and/or the state; Secret classification is for information that may 
                                                 
185 “Classified information is any information or material that is held by or for, is produced in or for, 
or is under control of the stats or which concerns the state and which must for the sake of national security 
be exempted from disclosure and must enjoy protection against compromise. Such information is classified 
either Restricted, Confidential, Secret or Top Secret according to the degree of damage the state may suffer 
as a consequence of its unauthorized disclosure.” Botha, Counterterrorism Training Manual, 228. 
186 “Compromise is the unauthorized disclosure or loss of classified information or information 
qualifying for classification, or exposure of sensitive operations, people, places or equipment, whether by 
design or through negligence.” Ibid., 228. 
 62 
be used by hostile elements to disrupt the objectives and functions of an institution and/or 
the state; the designation as Confidential applies to information that may be used by 
hostile elements to harm the objectives and functions of and individual and/or institution; 
and Restricted refers to information that may be used by hostile elements to hamper 
activities or create inconvenience to an institution or an individual. Because the CTU 
operates under the Home Affairs Division, I believe it would be most appropriate for the 
unit to align itself with the system in use at the governmental level. This would ensure 
compatibility and facilitate effective information sharing, especially because all 
government officials are bonded by the Official Secrets Act of 1972. 
2. Controlling Access to Classified Information 
Access to classified information should be restricted to personnel whose security 
competence187 or duties permit or necessitate such access under the “need to know” 
principle. For this purpose, CTU personnel must have the security clearances that give 
them access only to information with the specified grade of classification needed for the 
execution of his or her official duties. It is important to regularly conduct electronic 
sweeps of the premises occupied by the CTU as well as the conference room where 
Secret and Top Secret discussions take place to detect and neutralize any electronic 
eavesdropping devices. 
3. Securing Classified Information 
Classified information remains in a perpetual state of high vulnerability and the 
chance of being compromised if necessary measures are not implemented to prevent 
other states, organizations, or individuals from identifying and exploiting security 
shortcomings. The CTU must have strict guidelines with regards to transmission and 
storing of classified information. It first requires a secure information and communication 
system with encryption facilities for all stake holders to prevent the hacking of classified 
information while it is electronically transmitted. Furthermore, the operators responsible 
                                                 
187 “Security competence refers to a person’s integrity and reliability as regards classified and other 
confidential information, and includes factors such as his/her susceptibility to extortion (blackmailing) and 
bribery as well as negligence with regard to such information.” Botha, Counterterrorism Training Manual, 
229. 
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for transmitting and receiving classified information should have the highest level of 
security clearance. Classified data must not be transmitted through unsecure 
communication systems. Access to cryptographic devices should be properly monitored 
and used only by those with the required level of security clearance. And lastly, classified 
documents188 while not in use should be kept secure in a proper vault.   
D. STRUCTURING THE COUNTER TERRORISM UNIT 
In order to fulfill the mission with which it is entrusted, the CTU must be 
organized into appropriate functional modules, recruit appropriate staff with the relevant 
expertise, and enlist the services of liaison officers from the specialized units of the 
Mauritius Police Force. 
1. Organizational Structure of the CTU 
Due to limited resources in terms of finance and office space, the strength of the 
CTU will have to be kept as small as possible in the initial stages. A plausible approach 
to determining the ideal figure is to look at the functions that must be fulfilled by the unit 
under its mandate. As the CTU will collect information from the Mauritius Police Force,  
various ministries and public and the private sources, the initial stage will be devoted to 
processing and exploiting this information before it is passed on to the analysts. This will 
require a processing unit as well as an analysis unit. I believe that both units should have 
a domestic and a regional and international desk to avoid overburdening a single desk 
with information. A head analyst to coordinate the work of the analyst department and 
serve as the security adviser to the CTU decision making board will be required. The 
CTU will need a security and logistics manager responsible for the security of the 
premises and the information technology and communications network, as well as for the 
safe keeping of classified data. Also, the unit needs an officer to serve as overall 
 
 
                                                 
188 “Document means any note or writing, whether produced by hand or by printing, typewriting or 
any other similar process; any copy, plan, picture, sketch or photographic or other representation of any 
place or article; any disc, tape, card, perforated roll or other device in or on which sound or any signal has 
been recorded for reproduction.” Botha, Counterterrorism Training Manual, 229. 
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coordinator for all the liaison officers of the Mauritius Police Force and the various 
Points of Contact. Lastly, it is worth considering the inclusion of a planning cell to assist 
the decision making board with future planning.    
2. Recruitment Process  
Assuming that the initial strength of the CTU must be kept to a strict minimum, it 
makes sense to recruit people who can perform multiple tasks for the CTU. 
Unfortunately, such versatile individuals are rare or non-existent locally because we do 
not have institutions that provide training in the fields of processing and analysis, and 
consequently will have to send candidates for training overseas or bring in outside 
expertise to conduct a local training program with outside expertise. Therefore, I would 
argue that we should recruit candidates who have a good academic background, such as a 
bachelor’s degree, that makes them suitable candidates for such training. It would be 
most appropriate to recruit from police officers within the Mauritius Police Force who 
have worked in the intelligence cells of the units involved in criminal investigations. As 
the Mauritius Police Force is expected to be the largest contributor of intelligence to the 
CTU, the latter will benefit not only from their expertise and field experience, but also 
from their knowledge of how other intelligence agencies within the force operate. Also, 
the vetting process will be easier since the CTU will be able to access the records of 
conduct and performance of personnel who have already served in a disciplined force.189 
Although private organizations may have more academically qualified staffs, at this stage 
we lack the financial means to recruit from the private sector, as the salary scale in the 
private sector is usually higher than in the public sector. I suggest that the best option is 
to recruit internally and then provide the relevant training. It will be necessary to ensure 
that the candidates do not leave the unit prematurely if better opportunities in terms of 
salary and benefits are available in the private sector. Therefore, they should be expected 
to sign a bond with the government to work for the CTU for at least a specified period of 
time, and they should be given financial incentives during the time that they will be 
working for the CTU. This would create a win-win situation for them and the unit. They 
                                                 
189 Botha, “Security vetting is a systematic investigative process to determine a person’s security 
competence,” Counterterrorism Training Manual, 229. 
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will have higher qualifications that will help them earn a better salary once they leave the 
organization, and they will be valuable assets while working for it.  
3. Enlisting Liaison Officers 
In the absence of field agents, the CTU could benefit greatly by having a group of 
liaison officers from the various units of the Mauritius Police Force who are directly or 
indirectly tied to the collection of criminal and security intelligence. Among the best 
candidates from this perspective would be officers from the Crime Index Unit 
(responsible for the control and issuing of firearm licenses), Anti Drug and Smuggling 
Unit, Interpol, Central Criminal Investigation Department, National Security Service, 
Very Important Personality Security Unit, Traffic Branch (which manages the database 
for all public service vehicles and driving licenses), Passport and Immigration Office, 
Explosive Handling Unit, Groupe d’Intervention de la Police Mauricienne (GIPM), 
Crime Record Office, Crime Information Technology Unit, National Coast Guard, and 
Police Information and Record Office.  These officers would not be posted permanently 
to the CTU, but rather would meet regularly to discuss security issues related to terrorism 
and share information from their respective fields of operations. This will be more cost 
effective for the CTU than hiring full-time agents, and beneficial because these officers 
will have concrete, timely intelligence from their agencies. 
E. PROACTIVE MEASURES  
Besides the mission that it has been assigned, I would argue that the CTU can 
play a leading role in making the Republic of Mauritius more proactive in dealing with 
the threat of terrorism. Among other initiatives, it can assist security agencies responsible 
for the protection of critical infrastructures by assessing their security measures and 
working with them to make them more resilient. It might also sponsor awareness 
campaigns, through lectures in schools and community forums, to inform the public 




The focus of this thesis has been on how to organize the CTU of the Republic of 
Mauritius by using as models the three main U.S counterterrorism agencies–the National 
Counter Terrorism Center, the Joint Terrorism Task Force and the Intelligence Fusion 
Centers.  The in-depth analysis of these three models has been instrumental in identifying 
key issues that must be considered in any effort to promote effective information sharing 
among intelligence agencies and to establish agencies that are effective and efficient in 
fulfilling their missions.   
The effectiveness of intelligence agencies is greatly enhanced when they have a 
full-time staff of highly qualified professionals with relevant expertise and knowledge of 
other agencies, all dedicated to a unified organizational goal. Effective mechanisms and 
platforms for the sharing of information, including liaison officers, a common database 
system, standard operating procedures, and memoranda of understanding, all promote 
interagency cooperation and help intelligence agencies to initiate timely responses. The 
protection of classified information can only be ensured when there is a proper system in 
place for sharing, accessing, and safeguarding this type of information. Legitimacy of 
intelligence agencies in a democratic society requires that they have legal status and 
operate in strict compliance with the rule of law. Lastly, combating terrorism must 
involve a mix of both proactive and response-oriented measures.  
Organizing the CTU for the Republic of Mauritius to accommodate these points 
will definitely require legal and organizational changes, as well as the implementation of 
a number of administrative procedures. The implementation process must take into 
consideration the local context, specifically, the existing legal framework and availability 
of resources. The CTU must from the start be given a legal status with properly defined 
roles and responsibilities and proper oversight mechanisms to ensure that the unit 
operates within legal parameters. It will have to build a strong partnership with the 
Mauritius Police Force, which has a national network for the collection of intelligence, as 
well as with other public and private sector agencies that by virtue of the services they 
provide have compiled huge databases. The CTU must develop a protocol for classifying, 
accessing, safeguarding and sharing classified information to ensure that essential 
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intelligence is not compromised. The CTU will have to adopt an organizational structure 
that will allow it to effectively perform the tasks required by its mission and recruit the 
appropriate workforce. And in addition to its primary role, the CTU must also work with 
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